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The maintenance of price stability is widely recognised as the primary goal of modern mone-
tary policy, and the management of private sector in￿ ation expectations has become an essential
channel through which this goal is achieved. This evaluation aims to improve the understand-
ing of how the sensitivity of private sector in￿ ation expectations to macroeconomic surprises in
South Africa compares internationally, as this provides an indication of the contribution of mon-
etary policy in South Africa to anchoring in￿ ation expectations. If a central bank is credible, the
￿nancial markets should react less sensitively to macroeconomics surprises, because they trust
the central bank to manage these incidents and achieve the objectives they communicated over
the medium to long term. In this paper, the methodology of Gurkaynack, Sack and Swanson
(2005a) is adopted in order to measure the sensitivity of South African in￿ ation expectations to
surprises. A comparison of South Africa￿ s results with those of countries in the original studies
supports the contention that the SARB (South African Reserve Bank) has encouraged private
sector in￿ ation expectations to be relatively insensitive to macroeconomic surprises, and it o⁄ers
further support to the argument that the in￿ ation targeting framework facilitates the anchoring
of in￿ ation expectations.
1 Introduction
The maintenance of price stability is widely recognised as the primary goal of modern monetary
policy, and the management of private sector in￿ ation expectations has become an essential channel
through which this goal is achieved. The in￿ ation targeting framework for monetary policy adopted
by the SARB is a forward-looking regime. At its core, it claims to anchor private sector in￿ ation
expectations, facilitating the achievement of price stability while limiting the output sacri￿ce (South
African Reserve Bank, 2002). This central claim is evaluated in this paper and it is found that
the SARB￿ s successs at anchoring in￿ ations expectations in the face of macroeconomic surprises
compares well with other leading in￿ ation targeters.
Despite this success, the lack of coordination in South Africa between policy makers and the
market on various occasions, suggests that there may be room for improvement in communication
by the SARB. Despite warnings of a possible rate hike by Tito Mboweni, the Governor of the SARB,
the markets were generally surprised by the April 2005 and June 2006 rises in the interest rate. Data
available to the market and communication from the SARB had not convinced the market that the
threat was credible (Jo⁄e, 2006), and analysts questioned the reasons given by the central bank for
the rate increases of 2005 and 2006.
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1Section 2 provides a theoretical exploration of modern monetary policy and section 3 reviews
the available evidence regarding the transparency and credibility of South African monetary policy.
The methodology of Gurkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) is adopted in section 4 in order to
measure the sensitivity of South Africa￿ s in￿ ation expectations to￿ surprises￿ .A comparison of the
South African results with those of countries in the original studies supports the contention that the
SARB has anchored in￿ ation expectations relatively well and that in￿ ation targeting o⁄ers a useful
framework for the management of private sector expectations.
2 Modern Monetary Policy
It seems appropriate to base any critical evaluation of monetary policy operation in South Africa,
or proposal for its improvement, on a sound understanding of the objectives and challenges facing
contemporary monetary policy. Price stability has become widely accepted as the primary goal of
monetary policy1. Monetarists emphasise the long-term e⁄ects of monetary policy in the pursuit of
price stability, with Friedman (1948, 1953) calling attention to the lags between the implementation
of monetary policy and its e⁄ects in the real world. This focus on the long term naturally drew
attention to the role of expectations and required that purposeful monetary policy be forward-
looking.
If it is recognised that economic policy is not a once-o⁄, static decision, there needs to be a
conscious awareness of the implications of applying policy in a dynamic setting. Optimal control
theory has been widely used for dynamic problems, including policy decisions. If the private sector
is a passive participant, the benevolent policy maker could maximise a social outcome by making
an optimal decision, based on the state of the economy at the time and the historical development
of policy up to that point.
In practice, policy decisions are complicated by the fact that the setting in which they are
typically made is dynamic in terms of the interaction between thinking agents over time. Not only
do policy makers assess the environment and make decisions they deem best, but the public also acts
in its own best interests. Monetary policy models have largely been based on the assumption that
decision makers form expectations in a ￿ rational￿ way. This calls attention to the strategic nature
of the interaction. Through their economic decisions, the private sector and monetary authorities
impact on one another￿ s decisions. These ideas have had substantial implications for policy, guided
by compelling developments in the theory2.
In an evaluation of four monetary regimes, Mishkin (1999) identi￿es the use of a nominal anchor
as a fundamental commonality. He narrowly describes a nominal anchor as ￿ a constraint on the value
of domestic money￿and more broadly ￿ a constraint on discretionary policy￿ (1999: 1). He concludes
that transparency and accountability are essential to this end, regardless of the speci￿c strategy
adopted by the country. By maintaining transparency, central banks are allowing themselves to be
held accountable and limiting their own discretion.
In conclusion, transparency, accountability, credibility, and commitment to rules-based policies
have become central to the implementation of modern monetary policy. When policy makers commit
themselves to greater transparency and accountability in a way that is believable, they give their
policy credibility. If their commitment to low in￿ ation is regarded as trustworthy, the markets should
believe that in￿ ationary spikes are transitory. Their in￿ ation expectations of the longer-term future
would remain low; therefore, they would not adjust their market decisions in a way that adds upward
in￿ ationary pressure. This would allow the monetary authority to use less aggressive adjustments
1This approach acknowledges that monetary policy is not an appropriate way of pursuing economic growth, but
that price stability is a prerequisite for achieving sustainable growth and job creation.
2Theoretical developments of particular relevance are: the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976), the understanding that
policy can be time inconsistent (Kydland and Prescott, 1977), and the de￿nition of monetary policy as a path of
policy stances over time (Sargent and Wallace, 1981). For a survey of work on credibility since 1981 see Walsh (2003).
2to their instrument in order to maintain price stability, and the cost of tighter monetary policy on
output (the sacri￿ce ratio) would be lower.
3 Review of the evidence: Transparency and Credibility of
South African Monetary Policy
Current discussion surrounding in￿ ation expectations and the degree to which the SARB is e⁄ectively
managing in￿ ation expectations in South Africa is dominated by analyses of macroeconomic trends,
in￿ ation expectation surveys, and ￿ break-even￿ rates (the di⁄erence between nominal and in￿ ation-
indexed bonds of similar maturity ￿see Reid (2008), for a more comprehensive discussion of these.
However, none of the above measures directly examines the relationship between the changes in the
monetary policy instrument and other market interest rates.
Ballim and Moolman (2005) contribute to the literature by investigating the impact of changes in
the repo rate on a range of ￿nancial market instruments in order to capture the response of interest
rates at di⁄erent horizons. These include forward rate agreements (FRAs) with maturities of less
than a year and government bonds with longer maturities. Using a variety of empirical tests, they
￿nd strong correlations (diminishing with longer horizons) between movements in the repo rate and
short-term interest rates, and they ￿nd that the majority of the market adjustment occurs before
the decision is announced, suggesting that markets are anticipating changes in the repo rate.
Aron and Muellbauer (2006) extend the former study by using FRAs with di⁄erent dimensions to
identify the expectations of the markets regarding following policy decisions more clearly. However,
their results are similar to those of Ballim and Moolman (2005).
These two studies begin to empirically scrutinise the causal relationship between monetary policy
and market interest rates. Aron and Muellbauer (2006) still question the strong policy conclusions
drawn by Ballim and Moolman and propose that a comparison of the magnitudes of the responses
with those of another country would provide more indication of the room for improvement.
To avoid measurement error, it is also preferable to use the ￿ surprise￿ (the di⁄erence between the
forecasted value and the actual value realised) of the market after the announcement of a monetary
policy decision as the independent variable, rather than simply to use the change in the repo rate.
The markets may be surprised by the failure of the SARB to adjust the repo rate, or conversely,
a change in the policy rate may be entirely anticipated. The surprise component provides a more
precise measure of the new information presented to the market, to be considered when pricing
instruments. These issues will be addressed by the empirical study in the following section.
4 The Sensitivity of In￿ ation Expectations to ￿ Surprises￿in
South Africa
Recent work in a series of papers beginning with Gurkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a), have
o⁄ered exciting new insights. They investigated the impact of new information (macroeconomic
data and monetary policy ￿ surprises￿ ) on short- and long-term interest rates (the term structure of
the interest rate).
Using advances in the literature regarding how to measure the market￿ s expectations of interest
rates and in￿ ation in a period far into the future, Gurkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) ￿nd
that long-term expectations (as captured by the long-term in￿ ation compensation rates) in the US
are not as well anchored3 as one might have expected. Subsequent research found that long-term
in￿ ation expectations in the US and in pre-1997 UK (before the Bank of England (BoE) gained
3A nominal anchor should convince the public that the authorities will control in￿ation in the long run. Therefore,
the longer-term in￿ation expectations of the public should not react strongly to new information.
3independence4) were far more sensitive to surprise information than those of Sweden and post-1997
UK (Gurkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006). They interpreted this as evidence that anchoring
long-term in￿ ation expectations was enhanced through in￿ ation targeting.
These ￿ndings were reinforced through a study by Mauricio Larrain (2005) from the Central Bank
of Chile, who examined the e⁄ect of monetary policy surprises on the term structure of interest rates
in Chile. He found that in￿ ation expectations in Chile (an emerging market) compared favourably
with those of the US. The study by G￿rkaynak, Sack and Swanson has also been extended to test
its applicability to Canada and Chile (G￿rkaynak, Levin, Marder and Swanson, 2005). The results
bolstered those of the original study, with the forward in￿ ation compensation (di⁄erence between
the forward rates of nominal and real bonds) of Canada and Chile not showing signi￿cant responses
to domestic macroeconomic data and monetary policy surprises. An interesting peculiarity of this
article is that the Canadian far-ahead interest rates did show a degree of sensitivity to news from
the US, although it was still less than the response of the US.
That in￿ ation-targeting central banks are more credible than the Federal Reserve Bank would
be an unpersuasive argument. It is more likely that the systematic implementation and communi-
cation of monetary policy in the in￿ ation targeting countries reduces the uncertainty experienced
by ￿nancial markets in these countries. If a central bank were more transparent about its plans for
future policy, it would potentially be able to shape market expectations more directly and improve
coordination.
In this section, the methodology of G￿rkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) is applied in order to
more directly evaluate the link between monetary policy and the ￿nancial markets in South Africa.
It sheds light on the degree to which the international ￿ndings of G￿rkaynack, Sack and Swanson
(2005a) are applicable to South Africa, and investigates how well in￿ ation expectations have been
anchored in South Africa over the past ￿ve years, relative to countries discussed in other articles
above.
4.1 Data and Methodology
As with many studies performed in less developed countries, the availability of data, especially in
the form required, was a challenge.5 Following the model of G￿rkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a),
variables were created to capture the ￿ surprise￿ experienced by the markets, following a number of
macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy decisions; and the variable ￿ forward in￿ ation
compensation￿ was created as a measure of the in￿ ation expectations of the markets.
This enables an estimate of the impact of the surprises on the in￿ ation expectations of the market
during this period, using the following regression:
￿FICt = ￿ + ￿1CPIXt + ￿2GDPt + ￿3CAt + ￿4PPIt + ￿5REPOt + "t (1)
The change in the forward in￿ ation compensation on day t (￿FICt) was regressed on the surprise
components of the macroeconomic announcements on the corresponding day t. CPIX, GDP, CA
and PPI are the surprise components of the consumer price index, gross domestic product, current
account and producer price index data releases respectively; and REPO is the surprise component
of the monetary policy decision regarding the setting of the repo rate. "t represents the factors that
in￿ uence forward in￿ ation compensation other than regressors used.
The data set consists of daily observations of the changes in the in￿ ation compensation on the
day of each announcement. Only days on which an announcement was made are included, and
usually only one announcement took place each date, so on any particular day, only one non-zero
4The hypothesis is that an independent BoE should have more credibility because it reduces the extent to which
the government can use monetary policy to pursue other goals and sacri￿ce the attainment of the BoE￿ s objectives.
5In a footnote, Gurkaynack, Levin and Swanson (2006) identify some of the ways in which data limitations (which
tend to be worse in developing countries) have frustrated e⁄orts to apply their methods to other in￿ation targeting
countries.
4surprise was measured. The regression results can be interpreted as the extent to which in￿ ation
compensation responds (on average) to the surprise components of macroeconomic announcements
over the sample period (May 2002 - March 2007).
4.1.1 Macroeconomic surprises
The ￿ surprise￿component of the macroeconomic data announcements was isolated to re￿ ect the
fact that the balance of the movement of the macroeconomic data is not ￿ news￿to them and will
therefore not be responsible for the movements of the interest rates. Abrupt movements of the
interest rate shortly after the announcement would re￿ ect the extent to which they misjudged the
actual outcome. This is the extent to which the markets have received new information which
has not yet been re￿ ected in the pricing. To capture the surprise of the markets at the release of
macroeconomic data, G￿rkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005) calculated the di⁄erence between the
actual data released and the median forecast of a panel of professional forecasters, polled shortly
before that data release.
surprise=actual release-median forecast (2)
For the purposes of this study of the South African situation, the macroeconomic variables considered
were CPIX, PPI, GDP and CA. These were selected due to the availability of survey data and their
high degree of relevance to in￿ ation expectations.
With regard to the actual data releases, Van Walbeeck (2006) recently expressed concern re-
garding the size of the o¢ cial revisions to South African national accounts data, and the impact of
these on econometric studies using this data. He found that the o¢ cial ￿gures were often adjusted
substantially as more accurate information became available to the statistical authorities. The im-
plication for the data set used in this study is that the surprise experienced by the market following
a data release may be dispersed over time, as the o¢ cial ￿gures are revised. On consideration,
￿rst-release data was used, because, as Van Walbeeck (2006) pointed out, the ￿rst release receives
the most attention.
A series of consensus forecasts were required to capture the expectations of the markets regarding
the relevant macroeconomic variables. The median of forecasts from the panel of economists was
used (rather than the mean) in order to limit the in￿ uence of changes in composition of the panel,
and to minimise the e⁄ect of outliers.
The precise publication dates of the data were necessary to match the forecast and actual data
releases accurately, and then to match these surprise components with the movement in the forward
in￿ ation compensation on the day of each ￿ surprise￿ .
CPIX: The ￿rst releases of CPIX were collected from consecutive issues of the SARB Quarterly
Bulletin (2002 - 2007) by collecting only the last ￿gures, which had not yet been revised, from each
issue. Publication dates were provided by Stats SA and were compared with media reports, where
available (Business Day ￿various issues, 2002 - 2007), to con￿rm that there were no discrepancies
due to delayed data releases.
To capture the market￿ s expectations of the CPIX, the Reuters ￿ Econometer￿ 6 was considered
￿rst, as it is a comprehensive and reputable survey that has been conducted since October 1999.
Unfortunately, although the economists are polled monthly, they forecast for the end of the quarter;
therefore, matching the CPIX data releases (released monthly) with the forecast becomes a bit
contrived7. The Beeld newspaper￿ s ￿ economist of the year￿competition posed the same problem.
This increases the potential for measurement error and simultaneity. Alternatively, a series of surveys
conducted by Bloomberg (2002 - 2007) within the week leading up to the data release was used for
6Forecasts of a panel of professional economists.
7Although Reuters do survey the market￿ s expectations of some data releases for a shorter horizon, these were not
available prior to the past two years.
5the forecast of CPIX. This allowed the surprise resulting from each individual release to be captured
more accurately.
Figure I
Figure I shows the actual CPIX series, the forecast CPIX series and the surprise component.
The actual and forecast series run relatively closely together, which is con￿rmed by the dotted line
representing the surprise component, which ￿ uctuates gently around zero.
PPI: The PPI is also released monthly. Both the ￿rst releases of the actual data and the forecasts
(conducted in the week leading up to the data release) were received from Bloomberg. The dates
on which the data was published were collected from consecutive, electronic statistical publications
(Stats SA, 2002 - 2007).
Figure II
GDP: Publication dates of the quarterly GDP series were collected from consecutive, electronic
statistical publications by Stats SA (2002 - 2007). The ￿rst releases of the actual data were collected
from the SARB Quarterly Bulletins (2002 - 2007). The GDP forecasts were received from Bloomberg.
Figure III
Current Account: The ￿rst releases of the actual data were collected from consecutive issues of
the SARB Quarterly Bulletin (2002 - 2007). The dates on which the SARB Quarterly Bulletins were
released by the Reserve Bank, which would be the ￿rst public release of the current account data,
was provided by the SARB8.
Bloomberg did not provide forecasts of the current account releases the week before the data
release. Instead, the Reuters Econometer was used, but this was not as much of a problem as for
the CPIX, as the actual current account data is only released once per quarter. As described above,
the Reuters panel forecasts their expectation monthly for the end of the quarter; therefore, there
are three forecasts for each quarter. The last forecast of the three before the release of the actual
current account data (here the panel forecasts for the end of the month) was used in an attempt
to capture the market￿ s expectation of the current account balance as close to the data release as
possible.
Figure IV
In order to ensure comparability of the macroeconomic ￿ surprises￿and ease interpretation, the
di⁄erent macroeconomic surprises were normalised, by dividing each series by its standard error
(G￿rkaynack, Sack and Swanson, 2005a). The coe¢ cient on each macroeconomic surprise in the
regression should be interpreted as the variation in the forward in￿ ation compensation caused by a
1 standard deviation of the surprise.
4.1.2 Monetary policy surprises
The surprise component for monetary policy was calculated using market data rather than the
surveys, as this is available at a much higher frequency and is of a higher quality. The change in the
three-month Bankers Acceptance (BA) Rate (the SARB, 2007) on the day after the monetary policy
8Gratitude is expressed to Adri CronjØ of the SARB for providing the dates on which the Quarterly Bulletins were
distributed.
6committee (MPC) makes its statement9 was used as a proxy for this surprise component10. The
MPC announcement is made at 2pm, whereas the BA rate is set by the banks at midday; therefore,
the BA rate would only re￿ ect any surprise experienced by the markets the following day.
The monetary policy surprise series was not normalised, and the coe¢ cient on repo is inter-
pretable as the basis point variation in the forward interest rate, due to a basis point variation in
the monetary policy surprise variable. Bear in mind that the MPC statement communicates the
decision of the monetary policy committee regarding the present changes in the policy instrument,
but it may also provide an indication of the possible future policy stance of the committee.
Figure V
Figure V represents the surprise of the markets following a monetary policy decision (solid line),
and the path of the actual monetary policy decisions (dashed line). Sharp movements of the solid
line represent the times when the market was surprised by monetary policy decisions. During the
second half of 2002 and the ￿rst half of 2003 when the repo rate was being adjusted frequently to
manage the peak in in￿ ation at the time, the market was more likely to misjudge the movements
of the SARB. The two instances referred to earlier (April 2005 and June 2006), when the market
strongly criticised the SARB for its lack of predictability, are also re￿ ected in the ￿gure.
4.1.3 Measurement of in￿ ation expectations
G￿rkaynack, Sack and Swanson (2005a) isolated the in￿ ation expectations of the market by ￿nding
the forward in￿ ation compensation11, which is the di⁄erence between nominal and real forward
interest rates. Forward rate agreements, which are traded in the markets, are only available with
horizons of up to one year, whereas longer horizons are more appropriate for this study. However,
yield, spot and forward rate curves all present the same underlying term structure information
in di⁄erent ways, so nominal and real implied forward rates could be calculated using bond data
(Coleman, 1998). Implied forward rates and in￿ ation compensation calculated for South Africa in a
previous paper (Reid, 2008) will be used here as a measure of in￿ ation expectations for the period
May 2002 - March 2007.
According to the Fisher equation, the short-term nominal interest rate can be decomposed into
the real interest rate and in￿ ation expectations (Walsh, 2003):
it = rt + ￿t+1 (3)
where it = nominal interest rate
rt = real interest rate
￿t = in￿ ation expectations
Svensson (1994) proposed the use of forward interest rates for analysing monetary policy, because
a forward interest rate is related to an ordinary yield curve in the same manner as average and
marginal cost curves are related. Forward rates at a long-term horizon, show the expected short-
term interest rates at that horizon. Relying on the Fisher equation, forward in￿ ation compensation
can be presented as the di⁄erence between nominal and real forward rates:
Fwd in￿ ation compensation(9-10)=nom fwd rate(9-10)-real fwd rate(9-10) (4)
9Dates of MPC meetings from MPC statements (2002 ￿2007).
10Although the BA rate is a 3 month nominal rate, it is still a fair proxy for the monetary policy surprise caused by
changes in the repo rate, which is an overnight rate. See Mitchell-Innes, Aziakpono, and Faure (2007) for a discussion
of the evidence that shows that short-term interest rates in South Africa responded almost one-to-one to changes in
the repo rate over the sample periods relevant to that study and other research they referred to.
11In￿ation compensation includes both the market￿ s expectations of future in￿ation and the in￿ation risk premium
(the uncertainty associated with in￿ation at this horizon).
7In￿ ation compensation is, however, an imprecise measure of in￿ ation expectations, because ac-
cording to the asset pricing model, a term for the risk premium should be added to the Fisher
equation (the nominal interest rate should be decomposed into the real interest rate, expected in￿ a-
tion, and the risk premium).
Both Sack (2002) and G￿rkaynack, Levin and Swanson (2006) acknowledge that in￿ ation compen-
sation does not capture expected in￿ ation precisely, and they do not lightly disregard the in￿ uence
of risk premia, but they insist that these factors do not discredit their results. If the variations in the
risk premia over time are at lower frequencies than the daily variations in forward in￿ ation compen-
sation (the dependent variable), the risk premia should not have much in￿ uence on the coe¢ cient
estimates (G￿rkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006). Even if the premia decrease substantially over
time, their movement in one day will be very small.
4.2 Regression Results
The original studies (G￿rkaynack, Sack and Swanson, 2005, and G￿rkaynack, Levin and Swanson,
2006) use dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models as benchmarks, from which they
emphasise two important observations. Firstly, in agreement with a variety of macroeconomic mod-
els, the DSGE models show that within ￿ve (or at least ten) years, the short-term interest rates
return to their steady state. Secondly, if the short-term interest rate is approximately an average
of all short-term interest rates over the life of the bond, then it follows that this long-term interest
rate will move when economic news is released, as the shorter-term interest rates will respond. How-
ever, the forward rate at a long horizon (between years four and ￿ve, or nine and ten in this case)
should not respond to economic news in the present time period if in￿ ation expectations are well
anchored and transitory responses to shocks disappear before the long-term horizon is reached12. If
the forward interest rates at the long horizons do respond, it suggests that there is pass-through of
the economic shock to the in￿ ation expectations.
Over the sample period of this study, South Africa was an in￿ ation targeter, and the one-year
forward in￿ ation compensations ￿ ending in ￿ve and ten year￿ s time ￿ are expected to be well
anchored. Using the variables created above, this was investigated by regressing the nominal spot
rate and forward in￿ ation compensation rates on the surprise variables, using the method of ordinary
least squares adopted by G￿rkaynack, Sack and Swanson.
The surprise components of the macroeconomic data and monetary policy announcements are
listed vertically, in rows, in Table I below. The regression results reporting the sensitivity of the
one-year spot to these surprise components are presented in the ￿rst column, and the sensitivity of
the one-year forward in￿ ation compensation ending in one year￿ s time is presented in column two of
Table I. Column one has two highly signi￿cant coe¢ cients and the R2 of 9.2% suggests that these
variables do explain a portion (9.2%) of the variation in the nominal rate. The probability of the
F statistic (0.7%) indicates that the hypothesis that all coe¢ cients are jointly equal to zero can be
rejected even at the 1% level of signi￿cance. Similarly, column two has three signi￿cant coe¢ cients,
an R2 of 8.8% and the probability of the F statistic of 1%. Although the R2 of these two regressions
shows that a substantial amount of the variation in the nominal rate and the in￿ ation compensation
ending in one year￿ s time is not explained by the surprise variables included in the regressions, the
signi￿cant variables and highly signi￿cant F statistic show that the regression variables do contain
some information relevant for the movement of short-term interest rates. These statistics are also
comparable to the international results in the original studies, summarised in column one of Table
II. The question is whether this information passes through to long-term in￿ ation expectations.
Columns three and four, analysing the sensitivity of the one-year forward in￿ ation compensation
ending in ￿ve and ten year￿ s time to the surprise components, attempts to answer this question. The
coe¢ cients get progressively less signi￿cant, while the R2 decreases and the F-statistic increases. The
12Based on the benchmark DSGE models, the system should have reached a steady state by ￿ve (or at least ten)
year￿ s time, and therefore, the transitory responses should have died out (G￿rkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006).
8results of in￿ ation compensation at the ten-year horizon are especially strong. All the coe¢ cients are
insigni￿cant, the R2 suggests that only 0.7% of the variation in the in￿ ation compensation can be
explained by the surprises, and the probability of the F statistic (0.948) suggests that the hypothesis
that all coe¢ cients are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected. The crucial point is how the statistics
have changed. For example, the R2of 0.7% at the ten-year horizon is less than one thirteenth (7.6%)
of the size of the R2 of the one-year in￿ ation compensation ending in ten year￿ s time.
Table I
These results for South Africa are in line with those of G￿rkaynack, Levin and Swanson (2006)
for Sweden and the UK (after the BoE was granted independence), and those of G￿rkaynack, Levin,
Marder and Swanson (2005) for Chile13, which are summarised in Table II below. Notice that all
these countries adopt the in￿ ation targeting framework.
Table II
Comparing the results for the nominal spot rate and the one-year in￿ ation compensation ending
in ten year￿ s time, the coe¢ cients for the surprise variables in Sweden and the UK (post- central bank
independence) become substantially less signi￿cant. The R2 decreased from 7% to 1% in Sweden
and from 24% to 3% in the UK after BoE independence. The Chilean example as an emerging
market in￿ ation targeter reinforces these results.
It is illuminating to compare the above with the results for the US and the UK (pre-central bank
independence). The decrease in the R2 for the US is proportionately much smaller and, although
the signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients decrease, ￿ve of the eleven coe¢ cients are still signi￿cant at the
ten-year horizon. The results are even stronger for the UK before central bank independence, with
the R2 only decreasing from 35% to 21% and clearly re￿ ecting a strong pass-through from economic
shock to in￿ ation expectations at the long horizon. G￿rkaynack, Levin and Swanson (2006) suggest
that these results support the contention that the in￿ ation targeting framework of Sweden and the
UK, after central bank independence, result in a better anchoring of in￿ ation expectations than the
US (as a non in￿ ation targeter) and the UK before central bank independence.
5 Conclusion
It is important to realise that, although some of the most successful and in￿ uential central banks
have chosen not to adopt in￿ ation targeting, their execution of monetary policy is converging with
that of the in￿ ation targeting central banks (King, 2004). Both groups recognise the strategic na-
ture of monetary policy and use communication and transparency extensively in order to in￿ uence
expectations and increase the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy. The methodology of G￿rkaynack,
Sack and Swanson (2005) was applied to South African data in this paper and the results were
encouraging. The sensitivity of South African in￿ ation expectations for the period under review
is comparable with in￿ ation targeting countries analysed in international studies, suggesting that
in￿ ation targeting is o⁄ering a useful framework for monetary authorities in South Africa to com-
municate with the public and thereby anchor in￿ ation expectations. However, credibility building
is not a once-o⁄ exercise. The SARB should continually strive to promote coordination with the
￿nancial markets through transparent and predictable monetary policy.
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11Table I:  Impact of Macroeconomic Surprises on Spot and Forward Inflation Compensation Rates 
Note:  The sample period for the study is May 2002 to March 2007.  The numbers in the columns are the coefficient values and 
those in brackets are the corresponding standard errors (heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors were used).  The coefficient 
on each of the macroeconomic surprises should be interpreted as the variation in the forward inflation compensation caused by 
a 1 standard deviation of the surprise.  The coefficient on REPO is interpretable as the basis point variation in the forward 
interest rate due to the variation in the monetary policy surprise variable, measured in basis points.  *** indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  The probably value of the F statistic represents the 
probability that all the coefficients are jointly equal to zero.   
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observations  168  168 168 168 
R
2  0.092  0.088 0.039 0.007 
Prob (F-statistic)      0.007***      0.010***  0.266  0.948 
 
12Table II:  A Summary of Some of the International Results 
No. of coefficients significant at 
1% level of significance   8 of the 11 variables  3 of the 11 variables 
No. of coefficients significant at 
5% level of significance  2 of the 11 variables  2 of the 11 variables 
R
2  0.16 0.05 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000*** 0.000*** 
No. of coefficients significant at 
1% level of significance   5 of the 7 variables  2 of the 7 variables 
No. of coefficients significant at 
5% level of significance  0 of the 7 variables  2 of the 7 variables 
R
2  0.35 0.21 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000*** 0.000*** 
No. of coefficients significant at 
1% level of significance   6 of the 7 variables  1 of the 7 variables 
No. of coefficients significant at 
5% level of significance  0 of the 7 variables  0 of the 7 variables 
R
2  0.24 0.03 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000*** 0.051 
Sweden (Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006) 
No. of coefficients significant at 
1% level of significance   2 of the 8 variables  0 of the 8 variables 
No. of coefficients significant at 
5% level of significance  1 of the 8 variables  0 of the 8 variables 
R
2  0.07 0.01 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000*** 0.420 
Chile (Gürkaynack, Levin, Marder and Swanson, 2005) 
No. of coefficients significant at 
1% level of significance   1 of the 4 variables  0 of the 4 variables 
No. of coefficients significant at 
5% level of significance  0 of the 4 variables  0 of the 4 variables 
R
2  0.16 0.02 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.005*** 0.733 
 
1-year spot rate 
 
 
1-year forward inflation 
compensation ending in 
10 year 
US (Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006 ) 
UK (before central bank independence) (Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006 ) 
UK (after central bank independence 1998 – 2005) ( Gürkaynack, Levin and Swanson, 2006 ) 

























































































































































Expectation Actual Release Surprise Component
 
Source:   Bloomberg, the SARB Quarterly Bulletins (2002 - 2007), Stats SA (as above).   
  Surprise component – own calculation.  
 
Figure II: 



















































































































































Expectation Actual Release Surprise Component
 
Source:   Bloomberg, Stats SA (as above).   
  Surprise component – own calculation.  
 
14Figure III: 



























































































































Expectation Actual Release Surprise Component
 
Source:   Bloomberg, the SARB Quarterly Bulletins (2002 - 2007), Stats SA (as above).   


























































































Expectation Actual Release Surprise Component
 
Source:   The SARB, the SARB Quarterly Bulletin (various issues, 2002 - 2007), Reuters Econometer.   
























































































































































Source:  Data from the SARB. 
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